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Introduction
Can market power be really considered as "the price"  that a society as a whole
is called to pay in order to have a more dynamically efficient economic system?
The schumpeterian answer to this question would be certainly positive, the
"monopoly power"  being seen as the reward accruing to the successful innovator from
his/her innovative activity (Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey, 1997). More precisely, in the
schumpeterian tradition (J. Schumpeter, 1942), the bigger this reward is, the larger the
incentives to innovate will also be, with the consequence that, within this particular
research line, (ex-post) market power is generally considered as an important stimulus
to the R&D-activity (first schumpeterian hypothesis)  and, as such, it should
importantly contribute to increase output over time1.
Obviously, the major premise to this point of view is that the knowledge/R&D
capital is really the main "engine of growth" of a country and nowadays such a premise
seems to be fully confirmed by the majority of empirical evidence2. Lichtenberg (1992),
for instance, studies the role that R&D plays in accounting for the international
differences in the productivity levels and growth rates among countries at different
development stages  and, at this purpose, he estimates a model (derived from the
Mankiw, Romer and Weil paper of 1992) in which the aggregate production function
for each country is a Cobb-Douglas with physical, human and R&D capital as inputs3.
Using non-linear econometric techniques, the author finds, for the entire sample, that
the coefficient on the "R&D intensity" variable (the ratio between the total R&D
expenses and GDP) is both positive and statistically significative in accounting for the
international differences in the GDP growth rate per adult. The papers by Gittleman
and Wolff (1995) and Verspagen (1996) reach a similar conclusion, highlighting that in
the long-run there exists a significative correlation between technological variables and
real per-capita GDP growth4.
                                                
1many recent studies in the field of the Economics of Innovation  have shown that a higher concentration
in the product market makes the results of the innovative activity more easily appropriable by private
agents, so fostering their decisions of investment in R&D capital. In particular, Aghion e Howitt (1997)
write:"...(product market competition)...reduces the size of monopoly rents that can be appropriated by
successful innovators, and therefore diminishes the incentive to innovate"  (pag. 284).
2the empirical literature analysing the relationship between innovative activity and productivity growth
(not only at the macroeconomic level) is practically boundless. However, important synthesis of it can be
found in Griliches (1979) and, more recently, Monhen (1992).
3Lichtenberg’s sample consists of 74 different countries and the estimation period is 1960 through 1985.
4another very important result stemming from the work by Gittleman and Wolff (1995) is that the R&D
activity allows to account for the cross-country differences in the aggregate productivity growth rates only
when the analysed sample consists of the more (industrially) advanced economies. As far as the
medium/low income countries are concerned, the effect of R&D on the aggregate growth rate is almost
negligible, the development of these countries being a process mainly based on variables other than the
"technological" ones. However, another branch of applied literature (in the field of "technological
diffusion") convincingly shows either that the technological spillovers are quantitatively very relevant and
that they positively affect (above all) the developing countries. One of the more recent and significative
contributions in this area is certainly that by Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997), showing that: i) on
average, a one percent point increase in R&D expenses of the more advanced economies determines a3
Briefly, on the empirical side, the innovative activity seems to play a central role
in boosting the long-run wealth of nations (not only directly, but also, we would say,
indirectly, thanks to the diffusion of the so-called technological spillovers).
On the theoretical side, instead, though the idea (based on Schumpeter’s original
message) of a potentially positive relationship between monopoly power and aggregate
growth is both simple and clear in itself, it is not universally confirmed by those models
which are generally defined as "R&D-Based Growth Models".
At this aim, however, it is useful to recall the following two important things:
1) in the New Growth Theory there exist different "schumpeterian perspectives".
On the one hand there are models (such as Aghion and Howitt, 1992 and Grossman and
Helpman, 1991, chapter 4) in which the growth process is stochastic, reflecting the
uncertainty of the innovative activity (from which it derives); on the other hand, there
are also models in which the link between growth and innovation is deterministic (e.g.
P. Romer, 1990 and Grossman and Helpman, 1991, chapter 3);
2) in general, the first-type models (the stochastic ones, with vertical innovation)
predict unambiguously the existence of a negative relationship between (product)
market competition and aggregate economic growth (see Aghion and Howitt, 1997 and
1998), whereas the second-type models (the deterministic ones, with horizontal
innovation), and in particular the two models cited above, are less definitive on this
point.
In order to illustrate this, we analyse, in the next section, the 1990 Romer’s and
the 1991 Grossman and Helpman’s models in detail. The main conclusion we reach is
that only the second one accurately respects the message of the first "schumpeterian
hypothesis"  (stating that "ex-post" market power represents a necessary condition in
order to stimulate the innovative activity of the industrial enterprises and the technical
progress of an economic system as a whole).
However, one important limit of the G-H model is that it does not allow us to
calculate an optimal finite mark-up over the marginal costs (within the industry
producing technologically advanced goods), given the aim of the aggregate economic
growth rate maximisation (actually, in that model the "growth-maximising-mark up"
would be infinite). In other words, in the context of the G-H model, the relationship
between  β - the mark-up - and γβ ()  - the aggregate growth rate - approaches a
positively sloping straight line,  for β going to infinite.
                                                                                                                                              
0.06% increase in the output of the developing countries; ii) the technological spillovers coming from the
USA are, in absolute terms, the largest either because the USA are the major commercial partner of many
developing countries and because the total American R&D expenses are definitely greater than those of
any other industrialised country; iii) the main "propagation channel"  of technological spillovers is
international trade. This, in fact, allows the developing countries to use a broader variety of intermediate
goods, to imitate more easily the new technologies incorporated in them and, eventually, to increase more
rapidly the productivity of their own resources.4
On the other hand, in Romer’s (1990) model, such a relationship is always
negative (meaning that higher levels of market power in the imperfectly competitive
industry depress the growth rate of the whole economic system).
On the basis of such very general considerations, we build, in sections 2 and 3
rispectively, two models, taking explicitly into account the theoretical framework
suggested by Paul Romer.
In the first one, according to the G-H approach, we introduce in the intermediate
industry a "one-to-one" technology employing only human capital, while leaving
unchanged (in comparison with the original Romer’s paper) the technology of the
research sector (the production function of the final good is assumed to be in this first
model a Cobb Douglas employing only unskilled labour and N different varieties of
capital goods). With these changes, it is possible to note that, in the steady-state, the
relationship between β and γβ ()  (which is always negative in Romer) becomes
positive  for a given range of values of β (for β going to infinity, γβ ()  approaches a
positive concave function).
In the second model (in comparison with the previous one), we let the technology
of the final output industry employ human capital, instead of unskilled labour. By this
assumption we allow for the case of an increased “inter-sectoral competition”  for the
acquisition of the scarce resource (the human capital), now being used in each activity
of the economic system. The main conclusion we shall reach through this second model
is that γβ ()  is now characterised by a well-defined point of maximum [there exists a
finite β* (the mark-up over the marginal costs in the un-competitive industry) such that
γ (β*) – the aggregate growth rate – is maximised].
(At the end of the description of each model, we shall give the economic intuition
of the different results we get).
In general, what we show in sections 2 and 3 is that in the most familiar
“deterministic”, neo-schumpeterian models of innovation and economic development,
the relationship between (some) measure of market power and the aggregate growth rate
is not robust at all. Such a relationship, indeed, depends on variables such as the kind of
inputs each industry employs in order to obtain its own output and the way in which
these inputs are combined (Cobb-Douglas  versus C.E.S., for instance).
In the last two sections we respectively make very general comments on the
policy implications of the two models and summarise the most important conclusions of
the paper.5
1.  The role the monopoly power plays in the original papers 
by P. Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (G-H, 
Ch.3).











 (5), where ρ > 0 ()  is the individual discount rate, L is the aggregate
(fixed) supply of human capital, η > 0 ()  is the inverse of the productivity parameter of
the "research human capital", α 0 < α <1 ()  is a technological parameter and, finally, σ
is the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity6. (See Appendix A for the
derivation of a simple necessary condition that assures that γ  be upper-bounded in this
model).
Moreover, the price each producer of intermediate goods sets for his own output
turns out to be equal to a (fixed) mark-up  1/ α ()  over the marginal cost of production.





 (>1), then the growth rate  γ ()  can also be





















In words, β  (the mark-up charged over the marginal cost in the intermediate,
monopolistically competitive sector) always affects γ  negatively.
In addition to this, it is worth pointing out that in this model the human capital
(L) is exclusively used in the final output sector and in the research one and that the
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5for a simplified version of the Romer’s model of Technological Change, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995, pp. 226-230), from which the present formula is taken, and Aghion and Howitt (1998, page 39).
6the presence of this term  σ ()  in the formula of the aggregate growth rate is justified by the fact that in
the original Romer’s model  the istantaneous utility function of the representative agent is assumed to be
isoelastic.6
The economic intuition behind these results is quite simple: an increase in the
mark-ups (and, in this way, in the prices) of all the intermediate inputs, ceteris paribus
makes it more profitable for the final good producers to replace the capital inputs with
human capital. As a consequence, the demand for this factor continuously increases in
the final output sector (LY increases), to the research sector’s detriment (LR decreases).
At the end (when the mark-ups are very high), the whole human capital will likely be
allocated to the final good sector instead of the research sector (which is the true engine
of growth of Romer’s economy).
(For a formal treatment of the relationship between mark-up and growth as
stemming from the 1990 Romer’s model, see Appendix 1).
The G-H’s model (1991, Chapter 3), instead, is completely different. In this
particular case, the scarce resource (human capital) is used in both the intermediate and
research sectors7  and in equilibrium each producer of capital goods produces the same
quantity of output   xj = x =
1
Np
,∀j ∈ 1, N []
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜  ⎞ 
⎠ 
 at the same price
pj = p =
1
α
⋅w,∀j ∈ 1, N [] ⎛ 
⎝ 
⎞ 
⎠ . So, an increase in the mark-ups of all the intermediates











 and, as a consequence, its human
capital needs. In this way, the resources that are released by the imperfectly competitive
sector are necessarily allocated to the competitive research sector, being (also in this





























































Therefore, we can easily see that the intensity of the innovative effort (NN
⋅
/ )
depends not only on the mark-up (∂γ ∂β N /   is, indeed, always positive), but also on L
(a measure of the size of the market in which the new variety of capital goods can
potentially be sold)8. In particular, NN
⋅

















                                                
7in particular, the technology used for producing capital goods is a "one-to-one technology", with human
capital as the only input.
8obviously, this result is strictly linked to the "sunk" nature of the research outlays.7
This is why the relationship between γ  and β is positive only when β is very
large. On the contrary, when β is slightly larger than one, such a relationship can be
also negative (see Appendix 2 for major details on this point). Intuitively, when
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⎠ 
⎟ , the mark-ups (charged over  marginal costs in the
monopolistically competitive sector) are yet too small to let the constraint on L (a
function of β) be not binding (and, then, NN
⋅
/  be positive), so that γ  could even be
negative. Instead, when β>A (going to infinite), the constraint on L will certainly cease




 will tend to  L/a and γ   to infinite, too9. Finally, when β is equal to 1
(as it will be the case in a perfect competition situation), γ  will be equal to zero.
In summary,  it turns out that:
a) in a dynamic context, as far as the contribution of market power to the growth
process of a country is concerned, the G-H’s model seems to be much more in line with
the original schumpeterian message than Romer’s model;
b) whenever the link between γ  and β is analysed in a neo-schumpeterian framework
of innovation and growth, it is fundamental to examine the way the scarce resources
(those productive factors being available in fixed supply) are allocated and employed
within the economic system as a whole.
At this purpose, we present below two different models. Such models
encompass both the Romer and G-H ones and, through them, we show that it is possible
to reach different conclusions about the relationship between monopoly power and
economic development, depending on the particular way one models the structure of the
economy.
2.  Model 1
Following Romer (1990), we imagine an economy which is composed by three
sectors,  producing respectively an homogeneous final good, N different varieties of
technologically advanced goods and knowledge. The total supply of skilled (H) and
unskilled (L) labour is exogenously fixed. However, unlike Romer’s model, we shall
assume in this section that the final output sector uses just unskilled labour and
                                                
9when β →+ ∞ ,γβ () → β − 1 () ⋅
L
a
 (this means that γβ ()  approaches a positively sloping straight
line).8
intermediate goods, human capital being employed to produce capital goods and
"research output" (patents) only. In particular, we shall suppose, following G-H (1991,
chapter 3), that the production technology  in the intermediate sector is of the "one-to-
one" type in the skilled labour.
￿ The production of the final output.
The final output sector is competitive and is characterised by the following
Cobb-Douglas technology:










, 01 << α ,
where Y is total output, L is unskilled labour, xj  is the quantity of the j-th
variety of intermediate inputs which is used for producing Y and A and N represent
respectively a productivity parameter and the total number of capital goods invented up
to t . Unskilled labour is exclusively employed in the final output sector in this model.
Moreover, contrary to Romer (1990), in (1) the homogeneous consumer good is
obtained without human capital (in the next section we shall analyse the consequences
of introducing human capital in (1) as well).
(From now on,  in order to ease the notation, the index t, near the variables
depending on time, will be omitted).
The representative firm maximises its own instantaneous profits, taking prices as















where wL  is the wage earned (at time t) by a unit of unskilled labour and pj is the price
of a unit of the j-th variety of capital goods. In (2), Y has been taken as the numeraire
(P Y =1).
















pj, in (3), is the j-th intermediate input inverse demand function. Moreover, as
L is used only in the final output sector and is in fixed supply, without loss of generality
we can set L=1 and re-write (3) as:9






















￿ The  intermediate goods sector.
In this sector, each firm produces a (horizontally) differentiated intermediate
good which is used by the final good firms as an input. Each intermediate firm has
access to the same (one-to-one) technology,  employing skilled labour only:
(5) xh jj =   , ∀j ∈ 1, N [] .
Given N (the number of technologically advanced goods invented up to t), (5)












The firm producing the j-th variety, at each point in time seeks to maximise her
own instantaneous profit, subject to the demand constraint (3bis):
(6) Max
xj
π j = pj ⋅ xj −w⋅x j = A⋅α ⋅ xj ()
α
−w⋅x j.














where w is the wage paid to a unit of human capital in the intermediate sector (at time
t).





















, [] ∀∈ jN 1, .10















, [] ∀∈ jN 1, .
(6’bis) and (4’), taken together, say that each producer of intermediate goods will
decide (at time t) to produce the same quantity of output at the same price. In particular,














so that (6) becomes:
(6’’)
 
π j = p− w () ⋅ x = p − α ⋅ p () ⋅x = 1− α () ⋅ px =





= A⋅α ⋅ 1− α () ⋅ Hj ()
α
⋅N
−α,∀j ∈ 1, N [] .
This means that the profit each producer of technologically advanced capital
goods is able to obtain will be equal for each of them and decreasing in the number of
varieties existing in t  (N).
￿ The research sector.
Producing the generic j-th variety of capital goods entails the purchase of a
specific blueprint (the j-th one) from the competitive research sector, being









η  (η > 0) is the productivity parameter of the human capital employed in the
sector  HN ()  and N is the number of horizontally differentiated intermediate goods
existing at time t.11
As this sector is competitive, the price of the j-th blueprint will be equal, at time
t, to the discounted value of the profits that can be made, from t onwards, by the j-th
firm of intermediate goods.10
In other words, it will be the case that:
 (8)
() ()
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,  τ > t.
In (8), PNt is the price (at time t) of the generic j-th blueprint, π  is the profit of
the j-th intermediate firm and r is the (exogenous) interest rate.
From (7), it is clear that producing a new blueprint requires a quantity of human
capital equal to 
η





. As a consequence, the (static) free-entry







N =⋅ ⇒ =
⋅ η
η , 
whereP N assumes the value indicated in (8) and w is the wage paid to a unit of human
capital in the research sectot at time t.
In words, (9) simply states that the entry of new firms into the sector will
continue until the price that one can obtain from the sale of an additional blueprint





















∫ ⋅log Yt () dt
s.t.:Wt
⋅




⎩  ⎪ 
and the transversality condition, stating that lim
t→∞λt ⋅Wt = 0 (λ t being the so-called "co-
state variable")11.
                                                
10 in fact, there exists a 1:1 relationship among the number of blueprints (produced in the research sector),
the number of firms operating in the intermediate sector  and the number of capital goods.
11the reason why a transversality condition is considered is that the value of the consumer wealth (W)
must be asymptotically  equal  to zero, otherwise something valuable would be left over.12
In (10), U0  is the intertemporal utility function, log Yt ()  is the instantaneous
utility function,  ρ() > 0  is the individual discount factor and W, w and r are,
respectively, the total wealth of our consumer, his/her wage and the (exogenous)
interest rate (at time t).
Applying the Maximum Principle to (10) yields:




= rt − ρ .
In steady-state, when the left hand side is constant, r will be constant, too.
￿ The  equilibrium in the Human Capital Market and the Steady State.
In order to determine the optimal allocation of the (fixed) total stock of human
capital to the two sectors using this resource (respectively the intermediate sector and
the research one), in what follows we shall employ the same Romer's methodology
consisting in equating the equilibrium wage rates of the two sectors. To do so, we have
just to imagine that the human capital is an homogeneous input within this economy
and that the same skills actually being used to produce, say, technologically advanced
goods can be put into use to produce, with the same productivity level, also knowledge.
If this is the case, then two conditions must simultaneously be met:
(12) ww jN =
(13) HH H jN =+, ∀t.
The first condition (12) says that the wage earned by a unit of human capital in
the capital goods sector  wj ()  must be equal to the wage earned by the same unit of
human capital in the case this one were used to produce blueprints  wN () .
The second condition, instead, is a simple constraint, in accordance to which, at
any point in time, the sum of the human capital stocks employed in both the
intermediate sector  Hj ()  and the research one  HN ()  must exactly be equal to the fixed
supply (H).
Given this, let's begin considering the condition stated in (12). The value of wj
is expressed by (6'); in order to determine wN, it is worth noticing that in steady state
HN is constant and, according to (13), Hj will be constant, too. So, on the balanced
growth path, each sector employing human capital will be able to use a constant amount
of this input. As a consequence, (8) can be written as:13
(8’)
() () ()
() PA H N e d Nt j
t
rt =⋅⋅− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
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r⋅η + α ⋅ HN
.
Given  PNt, it is easy (from (9)) to get wN. Further, equating wj with wN, we
can write an expression for Hj, as a function of α , r, η and HN
12. Finally, from (13),
we can first of all calculate HN:
(13’)




































and, then, write Hj as:
(14)














Briefly, in steady state:
a)  r is constant (and exogenously given);
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(15-3)






















































(15.5) states that the output growth rate of this economy  γ Y ()  is a function of the
given total stock of human capital (H), the model parameters (η and ρ) and, above all,
β (the mark-up charged over the marginal cost of production by the monopolistically
competitive producers of intermediate goods).




In order to try to explain economically why Fig. 1 displays  right that particular























From (15-4 bis) it is clear that, given η and ρ,  γ N depends both on β
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Let’s now consider three different ranges of β:
1) when β is slightly larger than 1, the constraint on H comes out to be binding and γ N
(and, as a consequence, γ Y) may easily be negative. Basically, in this first range of β
values, the lack of a "strong" market power enjoyed by the innovating firms requires a
market large enough to make the innovative activity profitable;
2) when β takes on sufficiently high values, the constraint on H is likely to be no more
operative, so that both γ N and γ Y may be positive. In this case, the monopoly rents
accruing to the successful innovator are so high that, in order to stimulate firms to
innovate, there is no need for a large-sized potential market;16
3) finally, when β tends to infinite, both γ N and γ Y  will tend to 
H
η  (the highest
aggregate growth rate this economy may reach).
At this point, it is useful to make two further remarks.
The first one is that (15-4) exactly corresponds to the steady state innovation rate
found by G-H (1991, chapter 3, page 61), whereas this is not true for (15-1).
This is due to the fact that in this model we have assumed that the technology
being used to produce the homogeneous final output is Cobb-Douglas (and not C.E.S.,
as in the G-H’s model) 13.
Therefore, the main conclusions we can draw so far are the following:
1) in order to have a positive relationship between β and γ  (at least in any relevant
range of  β), it is fundamental to create a sort of competition  between the intermediate
sector and the research one for the acquisition of the scarce resource (human capital)14;
2) in addition to this, the "type" of production function which is employed in the final
output sector matters since it is potentially able (for high values of β) to modify the
shape of the above-mentioned relationship;
3) finally, the final output sector technology itself influences the level of the steady-
state aggregate growth rate of the economy.
A second observation we would like to make about the model outlined in this
section concerns the"behaviour"  over time of x (the quantity of each intermediate input
which is produced in equilibrium).









a) HH jt j = , ∀t;
                                                
13in fact, it can be checked that, given the production function:














, 01 << α ,
in the steady state (where xx j =
  [] ∀∈ jN 1,   and X=Nx=constant), [A] can also be written as:
[A’]































Comparing [A’] with (15-1), it is evident that, with the same intensity of innovative effort
(NN
⋅
/ )  and with identical technologies in the intermediate and research sectors, the higher value of γ Y
in [A’] can only be imputed to having used (in the G-H's model) a C.E.S. production function.
























  (where N0 is the number of capital

















































A qualitative graph of the xt  function is the following:
0                              t
Fig. 2
Fig. 2 implies that xt goes to zero, but only in infinite time: each producer of
intermediates reduces his/her output over time, whereas the total quantity of the sector's
output  (Nx tt ⋅ ) remains always constant (and equal to H j). The fact that the
equilibrium growth rate of output, given certain values of H, is positive (even though
the total production of capital goods is constant) depends on the endogenous increase
of N over time15 and confirms, once again, that in such schumpeterian-flavour models
the real engine of growth is represented by the industrial innovation .
Briefly, what the analysis outlined in this section confirms is that market power
(β) and market size (H) represent two basic"ingredients"  for economic development in
a general equilibrium deterministic schumpeterian framework of innovation and
growth16. At the same time, it seems also to emphasise that the way the (scarce)
                                                
15 a similar result can also be found in the original model by G-H.
16Jones (1995) shows that in most OECD countries, the number of engineers and scientists engaged in the
R&D activity has risen dramatically over the past half century, with no tendency for per-capita growth18
resources are distributed and employed in each economic sector is of paramount
importance in changing the shape of the monopoly power - growth relationship.
3.  What happens to the relationship between  β  and γ   if the
"inter-sectoral-factor-competition"  increases?
The economic intuition we can draw from the previous section’s model is quite
simple: if the fixed-supply input (H) is "contended" by the (monopolistically
competitive) intermediate sector and the research sector, then an increase in the






⎠  reduces, ceteris
paribus, the total intermediates output (N⋅ x = Hj, see (15-3)). As a consequence, the
total stock of human capital that may be used in the research sector  HN ()  increases, to
the advantage of the aggregate growth rate.
But what happens if the human capital is also used in the final output sector?
The answer to this question represents the core of the next section.
3.1 Model 2: An extension of the previous one.
In comparison with the model of the previous section, the present one differs
only for the final output technology, being now the following:
(16)









, 01 << α ,
where HY is the quantity of skilled labour used for producing Y.
If we retrace the same steps we have seen in detail in the previous section, then
it is possible to write the following main relationships:
￿ The  final output sector.








                                                                                                                                              
rate to increase proportionally. Obviously, this evidence contradicts one of the main conclusions of this
model (and the other most famous R&D-based growth models). Recent attempts to model the growth
process of a country as a process not depending  (or only asymptotically not depending) on the so-called
"scale-effects" include, besides Jones (1995), Alwyn Young (1998), Peretto and Smulders (1998), Jones
(1997) and Aghion and Howitt (1998, pp.407-415). In the last two models, the steady state growth rate of


















(17) represents the j-th variety capital good (inverse) demand coming from the
representative firm producing the homogeneous final output.
￿ The  technologically  advanced goods sector.
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, [] ∀∈ jN 1; .
(18) shows the wage paid to human capital in this sector at time t, whereas (19)
and (20) represent, respectively, the price and output of each variety of capital goods.
Finally, given (18), (19) and (20), it is easy to obtain the profit of the j-th
intermediate producer:
(21) () πα α
αα α
jY j AH H N =⋅⋅− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
−− 1
1
, [] ∀∈ jN 1; .
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(22) is the "production function" of blueprints; (23) is the price of a generic
blueprint at time t and (24) is the (static) free-entry condition.
￿ Consumers.
According to what was stated in the previous section (as far as the consumers'











￿ The human capital market equilibrium and the steady state
In order to determine the optimal allocation of the (fixed) total stock of human
capital to the three sectors using this resource, the conditions we shall use are:
(26) HH H H jt Nt Yt =++ ,  ∀t;
(27) ww Yj = ;
(12)  wj = wN.
In particular, (26) states that now H must be "distributed" to all of the three
sectors composing the economic system.
Needless to say that (26), (27) and (12) must be simultaneously met.
Following a procedure similar to the one used in the last section, it is possible to
show that r, γ Y, HN, HY  e Hj assume, respectively, these values (see Appendix B for a
formal derivation of this result):
(31) r =
α⋅ 1− α ()
2
η
⋅H + αρ⋅ α
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(30’) () () HH N =⋅ − ⋅− + − αα η ρ α α 11
2
;
(28’’’)  () () HH Y =−⋅ + 1 αη ρ ;
(29’’) () HH j =+ αη ρ
2
.
(25') shows, according to the most famous R&D-based models, that the
aggregate growth rate depends:
￿ positively on the scale factor (H);
￿ positively on the productivity parameter of research-human capital () 1/η ;
￿ negatively on ρ.
As far as the relationship between γ Y and the mark-up rate 
1
α




concerned, its  (qualitative) graph corresponds to the following Fig. 3 (see Appendix 4):21
0
   Fig. 3
From Fig. 3, it is clear that the higher "inter-sectoral competition"  for the
acquisition of the scarce resource allows us to determine the exact dimension that mark-
ups (in the intermediate sector) must have () ≅ 22 , 17 in order for the maximum growth
rate to be reached18. In addition to this, in that figure the decreasing length of γβ () ,
after point C,  depends on the fact that when market power takes on values  higher than
an upper limit  and goes to infinite (α  goes to zero), both Hj and HN go to zero (see
(29’’) and (30’)) and the entire human capital stock is employed only in the final output
sector (which is not the "growth-engine-sector").
Finally, Fig. 3 seems to be consistent (when β is included in the E-D range)
with the results recently found by Smulders and van de Klundert (1995) about the
linkage between (product) market concentration and growth (although, in their model,
the research activity is both deterministic and "firm-specific" ). In fact, they conclude
(page. 150):
                                                
17as it is explained in Appendix 4, this point of maximum is obtained under the specific assumption that H
is sufficiently large (and, in particular, H = 4ηρ > 3ηρ () ).
18however, it has to be stressed that, compared with the previous model, γ Y  is now lower. This can be
explained by the fact that it is HN  itself to be now lower ((30’) is always less than (15-2)).22
“[...] increasing concentration is conducive to growth to some critical level. It
should be recalled that innovation is an in-house activity. Each firm has to do its own
research for the product it produces, which induces fixed costs. With more
concentration, aggregate fixed cost is reduced and innovation is enhanced. Excessive
concentration, however, depresses innovation because large monopoly power induces
firms to aim at high prices and lucrative current production rather than at innovation
for high future profits”.
At the end of this second "exercise",  the following two major ideas seem to be
corroborated: within a general equilibrium deterministic schumpeterian framework of
innovation and growth:
1) the existence of a positive relationship between  β   and γ  (at least in a relevant
range of values of β ) is due to the employment of human capital in the intermediate
sector;
2) the final output technology (its functional form and the inputs it uses) importantly
contributes to influence (especially for high values of β) the shape of the above-
mentioned relationship.
4.  "...Schumpeter might really be right". Some policy 
evaluations about the models presented above.
In this paragraph we briefly analyse two major policy implications stemming
from the models presented above.
The first one concerns the possible impact of monopoly power on the
development level of a nation and can be stated as follows: given the general structure
of the economy we have been considering throughout this paper, and under the specific
hypothesis that the main goal of the Economic Policy Authorities is the maximisation of
the aggregate growth rate, the existence of market power in the intermediate sector
should be, at least to a certain degree, tolerated.
In fact, it is clear from the two models we presented that there always exists a
range of β values (greater than one) in which γβ ()  is positive and increasing.
Therefore, our analysis supports the main conclusion of "Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy"  (Schumpeter, 1942), according to which the monopolies assessment has to
be carried out not only in terms of static (in)efficiency, but also (and above all) in terms
of dynamic efficiency.  In this sense, the dynamic gains rising from the continuous
technological progress (induced by lower and lower levels of competition in the product
market) should be compared with the (static) welfare losses related to a higher (product)23
market "monopolization". And it is not impossible that, at least for particular values of
the mark-up term, the monopoly gains exceed the monopoly losses.
The other related issue concerns the size the mark-up (charged in the
intermediate sector) has to take on  in order to maximise the aggregate growth rate.
From this point of view, we would suggest the necessity for a public regulator to
implement a rule-of-reason-type approach. In fact, since an indiscriminate action
against any kind of monopoly might be (according to our models) inappropriate, the
choice of the "tolerable", growth-maximising β is tightly linked to the "type" of
economy the regulator faces and to his/her knowledge of the main characteristics of this
economy (which production processes do the different sectors use? In which sector is
monopoly power localized? How is the scarce resource distributed among the different
sectors ?). Depending on the answers to these questions, two different situations may
arise:
1) in the first one, the "optimal" (growth-maximising) mark-up would be infinite (model
1 of this paper and G-H, 1991, chapter 3);
2) in the second one, it should assume, for sufficiently large H (the total stock of human
capital), a finite (greater than one) value (model 2).
 Conclusions
One of the main findings of the New Growth Theory is to consider
Technological Change not simply as a "manna from heaven" (J. Fagerberg, 1994), but,
on the contrary, as the outcome of some activity intentionally conducted by private,
profit seeking agents (and R&D is certainly one of such possible activities).
In order to make formally explicit the positive relationship between the
economic growth rate () γ  and the intensity of innovative effort, in the early 1990’s
several theoretical models [Segerstrom et Alii (1990); Romer, P. (1990); Grossman &
Helpman (1991)] have been published. All of them share the common feature that
technology is a non-rival and partially excludable good, so that it is a powerful source
of positive externalities.
In such a framework, it is not surprising that the only force capable to stimulate
private agents to innovate be represented by some measure  of “monopoly power” (β),
accruing to the potential innovator (if successful).
However, the idea to consider the existence of any possible positive linkage
among market power, innovation and growth is not unambiguously present in the so-
called deterministic, neo-schumpeterian R&D-based growth models,  even if all of these24
approaches imagine a very similar general economic structure (Aghion & Howitt,
1997).
Starting from this point, in sections 2 and 3 of this paper we proposed  two
models encompassing both the Romer and G-H approaches and showed that, within a
more composite schumpeterian framework of deterministic innovation, a positive
relationship between market power and growth can stem only under particular
hypothesis concerning the kind of technology and inputs which are employed in each
sector composing the economic system. In other words, depending on the way the
structure of the economy is modelled, increasing market power may or may not
stimulate R&D, hence innovation and growth.
We think that this result is particularly relevant in terms of public policies towards
the intermediate monopolies, suggesting the necessity for a growth-maximising
regulator to assess case-by-case (depending on the general characteristics of the
economic system he or she faces) the type of his/her intervention.
Finally, as far as the future research work is concerned, it could be particularly
interesting, from our point of view, to analyse how the monopoly power-growth
relationship eventually changes  in the case an economic system (with our
characteristics) accumulates over time not only "ideas" (in the form of new, horizontally
differentiated intermediate goods), but also human capital, through a separate
"education sector". More generally, such an extension might be useful not only because
it is intended to relax an hypothesis which we find in all the most important models of
R&D-driven growth  (namely  that the supply of human capital is always fixed), but
also because it would allow us to verify how the development  of an economy is going
to be influenced by the simultaneous presence of two different state variables.25
Appendix A
In this appendix we derive the condition under which the steady-state growth
rate of Romer’s (1990) model is bounded.
If we assume that the growth rate of population (n) is equal to zero, that L(0) is
equal to one and that δ  (the capital depreciation rate) is also equal to zero, then the
consumer  problem can be expressed as:
Max
ct {} t=0
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(in steady-state r is constant).
In steady state we also know that all the variables depending on time grow at the












⋅ r − ρ () ,  from which it turns out that





In addition to this, from (b), we obtain:
(b’) λ t = λ0 ⋅e
−rt26
As a consequence, (c) becomes:
(c’)  
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In the simplified version of the Romer’s model of endogenous technological
change we have been considering throughout the paper, r is equal to (see Barro and
















This condition assures, in the Romer's (1990) model that the aggregate growth
rate be bounded.29
Appendix B.
In this Appendix, we show that r, γ Y,  HN,  HY  and Hj take on, respectively,
those values indicated in the main text of this paper (section 3.1). 














































The value of wj is given by (18). Equating (16') to (18), we have:
(28)
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Substituting (28) into (26), we get the following expression for Hj:
(29)












In order to find HY ,  we plug (29) into (28) and get:
(28’)



























=⋅⋅− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =

























⎜  ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 



















⎜  ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
































−⋅ −+ − ⋅
+−






So, (29) and (28') can be re-written as:
(29’)
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αα α constant.
In addition to this, in steady state we know that:










  (from (16) and (20)).
As a consequence:
(31)
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(28’’’) () () HH Y =−⋅ + 1 αη ρ ;31
(29’’) () HH j =+ αη ρ
2
.
Appendix 1: the relationship between aggregate growth rate 










1   is the overall economy growth rate.
The symbols have the following meaning:






 (>1) is the mark-up charged over marginal costs by each intermediate
producer;
￿ρ() > 0  is the time preference rate (or subjective discount rate);
￿η() > 0   is the inverse of the productivity parameter of the "research human
capital";
￿σ() > 0  is the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity.





















































 is a vertical asymptote)

















 for L > ρη.




























Qualitative Graph of  γβ () :
033
Notice that when  [ ) β ∈+ ∞ 1; , γβ ()  is always decreasing in β.
Appendix 2: the relationship between aggregate growth rate 
( γ ) and mark-up (β ) in the Grossman and 





















is the overall economy growth rate.
The symbols have the following meaning:






 (>1) is the mark-up charged over marginal costs by each intermediate
producer;
￿ρ() > 0  is the time preference rate (or subjective discount rate);
￿ a(>0)  is the inverse of the productivity parameter of the "research human
capital".
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0 (there is a vertical asymptote in β = 0).



































































Qualitative graph of  γβ () :
0
Obviously, the only relevant range of the function is, for our purposes, that
being at the right of β =1.36
Appendix 3:  the relationship between aggregate growth rate 
( γ ) and mark-up (β ) as stemming from the 
Section 2 model.

















The symbols have the (usual) following meaning:






 (>1) is the mark-up charged over marginal costs by each intermediate
producer;
￿ρ() > 0  is the time preference rate (or subjective discount rate);
￿η() > 0   is the inverse of the productivity parameter of the "research human capital".
Analysis of the First Derivative
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0 (β = 0 is a vertical asymptote).37
Intersections with the β -axis:
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Using all of these information, we can obtain the graph showed in section 2.38
Appendix 4:  the relationship between aggregate growth rate 
( γ ) and mark-up (β ) as stemming from the 
model of Section 3.1 .
In that section we found that:
()( ) ( )
γβ
ηρβ ηρ β ηρ β ηρ
ηβ
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The meaning of H, η  and ρ, respectively, is the same as in the previous
appendix.
Analysis of the first derivative


























The two roots (β1 and β2) will be real and distinct iff  () HH
2 2
20 −− > ηρ ηρ , which
impliesH > 2ηρ.
If  this condition (H > 2ηρ) is met, then β 1 and β 2 will also be positive, as
2 H + ηρ ()  is always greater than  H












0 (β = 0 is a vertical asymptote).39
Intersections with the β -axis






− + ⋅++⋅ − +=− ⋅ − +⋅ + + = ⇒
⇒=
HH H H H
and β2/3 =
H + ηρ () ± H




 β 2  and β 3 will be real and distinct iff  () HH
2 2
23 0 −− > ηρ ηρ , which implies
H > 3ηρ.
Thus, when H > 3ηρ:
￿ γβ ()  intersects the β axis in two real and distinct points (and in β=1);
￿ the solution to γ’ β () = 0 will be represented by two real and distinct roots.
In addition to this, β 2  and β 3 are positive, as  H + ηρ ()  is always greater than
H
2 − 2Hηρ − 3 ηρ ()
2 .
If we set H = 4ηρ  > 3ηρ () , then it is easy to check that:
1) γ’ β () = 0 in β=1,13962039 and β=2,193712943;
2) γβ ()  intersects the β axis in β=1, β=1,381966011 and β=3,618033989.
Finally, when β ≅ 114 , ,  () γβ ρ =−006 , , whereas when β ≅ 22 , ,  () γβ ρ = 013 , .
A qualitative graph of γβ ()  has been drawn in Section 3.1.40
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